

# Inflation Targets Reconsidered Comments

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# Outline

1. Should inflation targeting (IT) be reconsidered?

Yes. Review arguments

2. Which features of IT should be changed?

Other aspects of IT framework more important than  $\pi^*$


# A low inflation trap?

## *Economics*

*Clarification* (Eggertsson Giannoni 2013)

Traditional lack of credibility problem:  $\pi^e$  too high

$\uparrow \pi^e \Rightarrow$  aggregate *supply* shifts left




# A low inflation trap?

## *Economics*

At ZLB,  $\pi^e$  too low and  $Y$  is demand determined


$\uparrow \pi^e \Rightarrow$  aggregate *demand* shifts right, and so does equilibrium  $Y$

Suboptimal ex-post  $\Rightarrow$  lack of credibility in raising  $\pi$



# A low inflation trap?

## *Politics*




**Source:** *Inflation Rate* is the variation in annual US CPI for All Urban Consumers, from BLS. *NYTimes Inflation Articles* is the number of NYTimes articles containing the word "inflation" over the total number of NYTimes articles in a given year, from NYTimes Archive.

# Secular stagnation in the US?

In simple New-Keynesian models, equilibrium real natural rate of interest is a function of TFP growth.

But only a small deceleration in TFP before the crisis in the US





**Source:** TFP at constant national prices for US, from FRED. Business cycles run from the first year in a recession to the last year before the following recession (a specific year is considered a recession year if it has more than 6 months spent in recession, or if it starts in a recession begun 5 or less months before); monthly recession data from NBER Recession Indicators for the United States, as reported in FRED.

Source: FRED and Groningen  
data base

# Secular stagnation in the world?

Given world integration, a global phenomenon. But...

- No deceleration in global investment / global growth before the crisis



# Secular stagnation in the world?

Given world integration, a global phenomenon. But...

- No deceleration in global investment / global growth before the crisis
- Before the financial crisis, return on capital (profit rates / growth of profits) remained high
- A global savings glut? Perhaps...but will it continue?
  - Foreign reserves in emerging countries
  - China's low consumption
  - Savings and growth



# The ZLB: a concern anyway?

Even if no «secular stagnation»:

- Recent estimates of natural rate of interest:  $-4\% <$  in **last three** US recessions, though not for long  
Cúrdia et al (2014), Barsky et al (2014)
- Slow recoveries from banking crisis (debt overhang)
  - Reinhart-Rogoff 2014: in a sample of 100 crisis,  $> 8$  years on average to return to pre-recovery peak of GDP per capita
  - In Southern Europe likely to take much longer
- Future vulnerability to financial crisis and sudden stops

# Features of Inflation Targeting


1. Inflation as a nominal anchor (rather than the price level path, or nominal income)
2. A high /almost exclusive weight on inflation vs output  
A «conservative» CB to offset distorted incentive to inflate
3. Higher implicit penalty if  $\pi > \pi^*$  than if  $\pi < \pi^*$   
To gain credibility that inflation will stay low
4. The inflation goal,  $\pi^* = 2\%$

# 1. Inflation or price level targeting ?

In a liquidity trap, want to raise future  $\pi^e$ . This is done automatically if target a path for the price level

Svensson, Woodford

## Euro Area Price Index



**Source:** Monthly Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (*HICP*) for all items in the Euro Area (considering countries using the Euro in any given year), from Eurostat. *HICP 2%* shows the theoretical path of inflation growing at an average annual rate of 2%. *HICP forecast* is the hypothetical future path of inflation growing at the annual rate forecasted by the European Commission for the Euro Area for the years 2014-2015.

# 1. Inflation or price level targeting ?

In a liquidity trap, want to raise future  $\pi^e$ . This is done automatically if target a path for the price level

Svensson, Woodford

- What about supply shocks?
  - Relatively infrequent in the US (Justiniano et 2013)
  - Target core prices, or  $PY$

## 2-3. A Distorted loss function?

- Lack of credibility also if  $\pi$  is too low
- Risk and costs of low  $\pi$  trap
- Need to facilitate relative wage changes

A distorted CB loss function is unjustified, particularly in Euro area

=> Remove asymmetry:  $\pi < \pi^*$  should be perceived as very costly by CB

=> Increase weight on output (flexible IT)

# 4. Raise the inflation target above 2%?

Simple and direct, should be done, perhaps to 3%. But....

- Cost of high  $\pi$  even when unnecessary  
Coibion et al. 2012: calibrate NK model
  - ZLB once every 20 years, lasts 2 years (trend  $\pi=2\%$ ):  $\pi^* < 2\%$
  - ZLB once every 7-8 years (trend  $\pi=3\%$ ):  $\pi^* = 3\%$
- Association between high  $\pi$  and  $\pi$  volatility  
In the data and in theoretical models
- If  $\pi$  is high, indexation  $\Rightarrow$  some benefits are lost
- Costly to bring  $\pi$  down, once it gets too high for long

# 4. Raise the inflation target above 2%?

Politically difficult inside EMU - benefits mainly to SE, costs to NE

Same eg. as in paper, but 3 groups of countries, each of size 1/3  
SE ( $\pi = -1\%$ ), CE ( $\pi = \pi^*$ ), NE

Avg Inflation (=CE)	SE inflation	NE inflation	Years to adjust
1	-1	3	6.7
2	-1	5	4.2
3	-1	7	3.3
4	-1	9	2.7



# Summary

- Agree that IT framework needs to be reconsidered
  - Case for higher  $\pi$  is overwhelming in Euro area now (debt overhang even more important than relative wage changes)
  - Need to strengthen incentives to avoid low inflation trap
- Small increase in  $\pi^*$  is simple and direct way to do it
- But even more important to reconsider other aspects of IT:
  - P level or PY targeting
  - Undistorted loss function